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declares that bankruptcy status is not an automatic disqualification for a PPP loan, it appears that
a debtor under the Bankruptcy Code is not eligible. 5
Part I of this memorandum explores a recent amendment to the CARES Act, which
addresses debtor eligibility for PPP loans. Part II is divided into two sections describing the case
law on PPP loan eligibility. First, Part II explains the analysis known as the Chevron doctrine, on
which some courts have relied when assessing the SBA’s determination of PPP loan eligibility.
Next, it examines the conflicting case law where courts have come to different conclusions about
debtor eligibility.
Discussion
I.

CARES Act Amendment and Debtor Eligibility
In April 2020, the SBA published its Interim Final Rule (“IFR”) on the CARES Act in

the Federal Register. 6 The IFR was a formal, written notice of intent to implement the PPP, and
provided interested parties the opportunity to comment on the SBA’s PPP proposed regulations. 7
The IFR did not expressly state that debtors were ineligible for PPP loans. 8 Subsequently, on
December 27, 2020, Congress passed the Consolidated Appropriations Act (“CAA”), which
amended provisions of the Bankruptcy Code and attempted to codify debtor accessibility to PPP
loans. 9 Specifically, Title X of the CAA states that a “person may not be denied relief under . . .
the CARES Act . . . because the person is or has been a debtor under this title.” 10 This provision,
however, does not supersede the SBA’s authority. 11

Consolidated Appropriations Act, Pub. L. No. 116-260 (2020).
13 C.F.R. § 120 (2020).
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According to the CAA, Title X is not effective until the SBA submits a written notice of
approval to the Director of the Executive Office for United States Trustees. 12 In response to the
Title X amendment, the SBA issued another IFR in January 2021, where it clearly stated that
bankruptcy debtors are not eligible for PPP loans. 13 Furthermore, if the debtor becomes a
petitioner for relief under the Bankruptcy Code subsequently to filing a PPP loan application, it
is the responsibility of the applicant to notify the SBA so the application can be withdrawn. 14
II. Case Law on Debtor Eligibility and PPP Loans
A. Chevron and the “Arbitrary and Capricious” Standard
Section 706(2)(a) of the Administrative Procedure Act (“APA”) provides that a
“reviewing court shall . . . [among other things] hold unlawful and set aside agency action,
findings, and conclusions found to be arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise
not in accordance with law . . . .” 15 In Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense
Council, Inc., the United States Supreme Court created the legal standard by which courts review
an agency’s actions under its statutorily delegated authority. 16 There, the Court held that the EPA
did not abuse its statutorily delegated authority when it interpreted an amendment to the Clean
Air Act which did not define “source.” 17
In its assessment, the Court set forth a two-part test. First, the reviewing court must
determine whether Congress has expressly addressed the issue in the statute that delegates
authority to the agency. 18 If so, the agency must follow the express terms. 19 Next, if the statute is
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Id.
See Business Loan Program Temporary Changes; Paycheck Protection Program as Amended by Economic Aid
Act, SBA No. SBA-2021-0001, 26 (Jan. 6, 2021).
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Id. at 26–27.
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5 U.S.C. § 706 (explaining the judicial scope of review over agency decisions).
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ambiguous, the court must decide “whether the agency’s answer is a permissible construction of
the statute.” 20 The Court then established what is known as the Chevron deference when it
clarified that if Congress “left a gap for the agency to fill,” the agency will be afforded deference
for its interpretation of the statute “unless [it is] arbitrary, capricious, or manifestly contrary to
the statute.” 21 Thus, because Congress did not express a specific intent regarding the definition
of “source,” it was acceptable for the EPA to employ its agency expertise regarding pollution
sources in this case. 22
B. PPP Loan Case Law
Courts have adopted the Chevron analysis to assess whether debtors are eligible for PPP
loans. 23 In In re Roman Catholic Church, a New Mexico bankruptcy court reviewed the SBA’s
denial of a PPP loan to the church because of its bankruptcy status and held that bankruptcy does
not preclude PPP loan eligibility.24 There, the court applied the two-part Chevron test, and
determined that the SBA “exceeded its authority by trying to prohibit bankruptcy debtors from
getting PPP funds . . . [and thus, was] not entitled to Chevron deference.” 25 Specifically, the
court noted that if Congress meant to exclude debtors from these loans, it would not have
enacted a separate statute for loans to mid-size businesses wherein it listed bankruptcy debtors as
ineligible. 26 To the court, this was a direct “usurpation of Congressional authority,” 27 and
“arbitrary and capricious” under APA § 706(2)(a), which gives the court the authority to overrule

Id. at 2781–82.
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Skefos v. Carranza (In re Skefos), 2020 Bankr. LEXIS 1479 (Bankr. W.D.Tenn. 2020); USF Fed. Credit Union v.
Gateway Radiology Consultants, P.A. (In re Gateway Radiology Consultants, P.A.), 983 F.3d 1239 (11th Cir.
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and agency decision. 28 As such, the SBA’s decision was reversed, and the church was awarded
entitlement to the PPP loan it requested, as well as the option to pursue compensatory and
punitive damages if the loan was not granted by the SBA. 29
Similarly, in In re Skefos, a Tennessee bankruptcy court held that the SBA acted
“arbitrarily and capriciously in excluding applicants whose owners are debtors in bankruptcy
from the PPP.” 30 There, a daycare was denied a PPP loan because the president of the daycare
was a bankruptcy debtor. 31 The SBA argued that it included a preliminary question regarding
bankruptcy status on its PPP loan application because this was an efficient way to avoid
individual credit checks for all applicants. 32 Adopting the Chevron analysis, the court asserted
that “the exclusion of entities whose owner is ‘presently involved in a bankruptcy’ is even
further removed from Congress's expressed intent of providing payroll support to struggling
Americans.” 33 Furthermore, the bankruptcy court stressed that Congress intended the PPP to be
more akin to a grant where creditworthiness is immaterial, and where business owner can get a
“fresh start.” 34 Subsequently, the court granted an injunction to prohibit the SBA from future
denials based on debtor status. 35
Likewise, in In re Gateway Radiology Consultants, P.A., the Eleventh Circuit employed
the Chevron analysis, yet came to a different conclusion. 36 There, the court held in favor of the
SBA’s decision to exclude a bankruptcy debtor from a PPP loan.37 The debtor falsely claimed
that it was not involved in a bankruptcy proceeding when it filled out the SBA’s PPP application,
5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(a).
615 B.R. at 657.
30
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and as a result, was preliminarily approved. 38 However, as required by the Bankruptcy Code, the
debtor needed approval from the bankruptcy court before receiving the loan. 39 The SBA objected
to the debtor’s motion for approval when it discovered that the debtor was in Chapter 11. 40 In its
Chevron analysis, the Eleventh Circuit reasoned that because Congress did not explicitly address
debtor eligibility, it gave discretion to the SBA on how to implement the PPP. 41 In response to
the debtor’s claim that the PPP is a grant, which implies forgiveness and debtor eligibility, the
court emphasized that PPP loans are only forgiven for certain “allowable uses.” 42 Furthermore,
not all “allowable uses” are forgiven; therefore, the SBA acted reasonably in considering debtor
status and the ability to pay back a PPP loan. 43
In In re Hidalgo Cty. Emergency Serv. Found., the Fifth Circuit did not rely on Chevron,
but it ultimately deferred to the SBA. 44 As with the previous cases, the debtor was denied a PPP
loan because it filed for relief under Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code. 45 Instead of addressing
the nature of the SBA’s PPP rulemaking and eligibility decisions, the court simply stated that
injunctions against the SBA are prohibited under Fifth Circuit precedent. 46 Thus, the injunction
previously issued by the bankruptcy court against the SBA and in favor of the debtor was
reversed. 47
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Conclusion
Prior to the CAA, the case law regarding PPP loan availability to debtors was split.
However, the regulations are clear – debtors are not eligible for PPP loans. 48 Title X of the CAA
is an attempt to expand PPP loan eligibility to debtors; however, the SBA retains the authority to
reject this amendment. 49 As of its IFR issued January 2021, the SBA has not withdrawn its
stance that anyone currently part of a bankruptcy case, or who has become a bankruptcy debtor
after submitting its loan application, is not eligible for a PPP loan. 50 No matter the courts’
opinions thus far, until the SBA submits its written approval of the Title X amendment, debtors
are statutorily ineligible for a PPP loan. 51

See Business Loan Program Temporary Changes; Paycheck Protection Program as Amended by Economic Aid
Act, SBA No. SBA-2021-0001, 26 (Jan. 6, 2021).
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